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Abstract.  This paper examines the effect of cross-border production sharing on 
trade and exchange-rate behavior.  When a country’s exports contain imported 
components, changes in exchange rates tend to have offsetting effects on imports and 
exports.  Imports may fall, remain unchanged or even rise with depreciation, 
depending on the share of domestic value-added in exports.  The effect of domestic 
and foreign GDP on imports and exports is also altered by production sharing.  These 
behavior patterns are identified in trade in motor vehicles between the United States 
and Mexico with the aid of OLS and VEC techniques. 
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1. Introduction 
Exchange rates, home and foreign prices, and home and foreign incomes are key 
explanatory variables in standard trade equations.  The empirical evidence suggests 
overwhelmingly that exchange rates and incomes matter in determining the flow of 
trade.  Domestic GDP helps explain imports, while foreign GDP influences exports.  
These findings apply to trade in end products and to intermediate products destined 
for use in the importing country.  In recent years, however, the growth of cross-
border fragmentation of production has generated trade patterns in which parts and 
components flow from one country to another, to be assembled into products that are 
then exported rather than used at home. 
The object of this study is to assess the extent to which goods flowing within 
production networks alter the sensitivity of trade to the aforementioned determinants.  
The focus is on U.S.-Mexico trade, where we find that cross-border production 
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sharing reduces the responsiveness of trade to movements in the exchange rate and 
that a country’s own GDP affects the demand for its exports. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 sets out the basic 
analytical framework and discusses some stylized facts.  The focus is on production 
sharing in the automobile sector between the U.S. and Mexico.  Section 3 presents 
and assesses the empirical evidence; and section 4 concludes the study. 
 
2.  Trade Patterns under Cross-border Production Sharing 
Production sharing between the U.S. and Mexico came into its own in the 
maquiladora program and continues under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).  It plays a key role in several industries, including textiles and 
apparel, motor vehicles, electronics, and processed foods.  In its original 
manifestation in the motor vehicles sector, for example, Mexico’s primary 
contribution was to assemble U.S.-made parts and components into finished 
automobiles destined mainly for the U.S. market.  In more recent years, the nature of 
production sharing between the two countries has become more complex, as 
Mexican producers have begun to supply components, in addition to providing 
assembly.  While U.S. firms play a dominant role in this relationship, multinationals 
from Europe and Japan are also active in Mexico. 
Similar forms of interaction may be found in other sectors, including textiles 
and apparel, where cotton and various types of fibers are exported to Mexico, to be 
used in the manufacture of apparel destined for the United States.  In the agricultural 
sector, raw produce is shipped to Mexico and returns to the U.S. in processed form.  
In this instance, the transformation is from imports of non-manufactures into exports 
of manufactures.  We explore the implications of this phenomenon below. 
 
2.1  Fragmentation and factor intensities 
Cross-border production sharing pushes specialization from the level of products to 
that of components.  Hence, if factor intensities vary across the components of 
products, then the factor-proportions theory should be useful in explaining 
component specialization across countries.  Labor-abundant countries like Mexico 
would be expected to specialize in labor-intensive components and labor-intensive 
assembly, while capital- and skill-rich countries like the United States have 
comparative advantage in capital- and skill-intensive components and skill-intensive 
assembly.  These considerations have been examined in the recent literature on 
fragmentation; our focus here is on the key determinants of trade flows when 
production sharing is present.2
 
2.2  The role of GDP 
According to the standard trade model, Mexican GDP is an important determinant of 
imports from the U.S., while U.S. GDP helps determine Mexican exports to the U.S.  
In the context of cross-border production sharing, however, Mexico’s imports from 
the U.S. include parts and components for use not by Mexicans, but in the 
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manufacture of exports to the U.S.   For this type of import, variations in Mexican 
GDP should be unimportant, while U.S. GDP should play a larger role, because it 
determines the demand for imported automobiles.  In this context, Mexico’s demand 
for component imports is a derived demand, which rises when U.S. demand for 
automobile imports rises.  Variations in Mexico’s GDP would, of course, continue to 
explain traditional imports (which may include imported components for direct use 
by Mexicans).  Hence, the relative importance of the two GDPs in explaining 
Mexican imports depends on the share of network trade in total imports. 
Our expectation, therefore, is that the explanatory power of Mexican GDP 
falls and that of U.S. GDP rises as the share of network trade in the dependent 
variable rises.  These response patterns should be apparent in a comparison, for 
example, of imports of auto parts and components with merchandise imports 
generally.  We test this expectation by examining trade at both aggregate and sector-
specific levels. 
 
2.3  The exchange rate 
Traditionally, appreciation of a country’s currency raises imports and lowers exports, 
ceteris paribus.  In the presence of production sharing, on the other hand, the rise in 
the peso price of U.S.-made components tends to raise the peso price of the Mexican 
end product, but the dollar price of that product is affected in the opposite direction 
by the peso’s depreciation.3  These offsetting tendencies affect the degree of pass-
through and thus the sensitivity of trade flows to changes in the exchange rate.  The 
extent to which the dollar’s appreciation reduces the dollar price of the end product 
declines as the share of Mexican value-added in the end product declines. 
Note, moreover, that the decline in its dollar price is expected to raise the 
demand for the imported end product, which in turn will raise the demand for 
imports of U.S. components.  Here, an appreciation of the dollar raises the demand 
for U.S. exports.  The traditional negative response of exports following a dollar 
appreciation continues to hold, of course, for products and components that are not 
part of the production-sharing loop.  Thus, the net effect of the appreciation on 
overall U.S. exports to Mexico may be negative, zero, or positive, depending on the 
share of production-sharing trade in total exports, the share of Mexican value added 
in exported end products, and the price elasticity of U.S. demand for the end 
product.4
 
2.4  Changes in the terms of trade 
The trade-balance implications of terms-of-trade changes may also be affected by 
production sharing.   Mexican inflation, for example, raises the demand for imports 
and reduces exports in the traditional model, causing the trade balance to deteriorate.  
Inflation raises the cost of Mexican value-added in motor vehicles shipped to the 
United States and thus reduces the U.S. demand for them.  Such a decline in vehicle 
exports, however, reduces the demand for component imports from the U.S., which 
tends to mute the overall effect of the price change on the trade balance.  Analogous 
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considerations apply to the effects of price inflation in the United States.  Together, 
the weakened or ambiguous influence of the nominal exchange rate and of relative 
prices suggests that the effect of the real exchange rate is also more tenuous. 
 
3.  Econometrics 
The preceding discussion suggests, first, that the sensitivity of trade to the exchange 
rate declines with the rise of production sharing.  Hence, in sectors with high shares 
of trade flowing within production networks, the exchange-rate effect should be 
weaker than in sectors in which network trade is low or absent.  The sensitivity of 
trade in motor vehicles and motor vehicle components, for example, should be lower 
than that of overall manufacturing imports and exports.  Second, the role of the 
component-importing country’s GDP in explaining imports should decline and the 
role of the component-exporting country’s GDP should grow as the importance of 
cross-border sourcing and of network trade rises. 
Trade policy plays an important role in determining the feasibility of 
production sharing, particularly as it pertains to restrictions on investment flows, 
foreign ownership, and right-of-establishment issues.  In the U.S.-Mexico case, 
NAFTA relaxed or removed a variety of restrictive policies pertaining to trade and 
foreign investment.  Of course, other acts of trade liberalization, including 
completion of the Uruguay Round, helped reduce the costs associated with cross-
border production sharing, and innovations in communications and transportation 
technologies made a major contribution to cost reduction. 
As noted earlier, production sharing between the U.S. and Mexico predates 
NAFTA, and was already widespread under the maquiladora program.  The focus of 
this paper is on the extent to which implementation of NAFTA has intensified cross-
border linkages. However, shortly after the official inception of NAFTA in early 
1994, Mexico experienced a major exchange-rate crisis, with significant disruptions 
of economic activity.  The coincidence of these events raises potential problems for 
the empirical analysis, an issue which we explore more fully below. 
 
3.1  Data analysis and regressions 
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to explore the implications of production 
sharing for the key relationships of the standard trade model.  The point is not to test 
alternative trade theories, but to compare the results when the model is applied to 
different categories of exports and imports, where a key feature distinguishing the 
trade categories is the relative importance of production sharing. 
We take as our standard import-export equation a specification that includes 
GDP, the real exchange rate, and variables representing NAFTA on the right-hand 
side.  We examine those relationships with quarterly data for bilateral trade between 
the U.S. and Mexico covering the period from the first quarter of 1989 to the fourth 
quarter of 2002.5
The basic model is then applied to U.S. trade with Mexico in three categories: 
exports and imports of manufactures, exports of non-manufactures and imports of 
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non-manufactures excluding petroleum,6 and imports of passenger vehicles and 
exports of motor vehicle parts and components. The degree to which the categories 
can be classified as traditional or non-traditional trade is summarized in Table 1. On 
the side of U.S. imports, non-manufacturing trade is the most traditional of the three 
categories, in that it contains virtually no network trade.  It should thus display 
behavior most consistent with the predictions of the traditional model. 
Imports of manufactures have a higher content of network trade, including 
motor vehicles, processed foods, textiles and electronics. They should thus display 
results that conform less well with, or deviate from, the predictions of the traditional 
model.  Finally, motor vehicle imports are fully embedded in network trade and 
should thus display behavior that differs significantly from the traditional model. 
On the side of U.S. exports, manufactures should display behavior that is 
most consistent with the traditional model, because the share of network trade is 
relatively small.  The share is larger in non-manufacturing exports to Mexico, in 
view of the importance of exports of agricultural raw materials for use in the 
manufacture of processed food for the United States market and of cotton and 
textiles for use in the manufacture of apparel exports to the United States. 
 
3.2  Statistical properties of the time series 
Time series tests of the variables suggest that the logs of real imports, real U.S. GDP, 
and the real exchange rate, defined as the peso price of the dollar adjusted by the 
ratio of U.S. to Mexican wholesale prices, are all I(1) variables (Appendix Table 
A.1).7  As reflected by the Engle-Granger8 test statistics reported in the relevant 
tables, the I(1) variables appear to be cointegrated. This enables us to run the OLS 
regressions in level terms and thereby provides an easy means of assessing the nature 
of the long-run relationships involved.9
Still, the concern may be raised that the relationship is misspecified by the 
traditional OLS representation, particularly with respect to the designation of 
dependent and independent variables.  Contemporaneous relationships may be 
statistically consistent, but erroneous representations of the true underlying 
relationships.  For example, Torres and Vela (2003) present evidence suggesting that 
Mexican GDP may be a lagged or contemporaneous function of U.S. GDP, exports 
and the dollar exchange rate. 
The traditional specification of the trade equation adopts the perspective that 
causality runs from GDP and the real exchange rate to exports and imports.  The 
standard open-economy macro model, on the other hand, allows for the possibility 
that changes in exports may affect GDP.  This raises another potential concern about 
causality: in the presence of production sharing, exports affect imports and imports 
of components may thus appear to Granger-cause10 domestic output.  Analogous 
concerns arise with respect to the direction of causality between bilateral imports and 
exports and the exchange rate.  The correlation matrices presented in Appendix 
Table A.2 reflect both the strong contemporaneous co-movements and the common 
trends among our variables of interest.  The real exchange rate is the exception. 
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We adopted two approaches to address these problems.  First, we performed 
Granger tests to determine if consistent causality relations can be established among 
and across the variables of interest. However, Granger tests for inter-temporal causal 
relationships among the variables produced results which varied with the lag length. 
So much so, in fact, that no clear and consistent set of causal relations could be 
established using the Granger technique. 
Second, remaining agnostic with respect to the question of causality, we 
estimated a vector-error-correction (VEC) specification of the relationship between 
the import and export series and their explanatory variables. The vector-error-
correction estimations were constrained by the OLS-generated coefficients and then 
re-estimated in unconstrained form.11  We calculated likelihood ratios (LR) for 
constrained (OLS) versus unconstrained representations. The likelihood of the 
import regression results was not significantly improved by the unconstrained VEC 
model, and so we accept the null hypothesis of the OLS representations for imports. 
However, the LR statistics indicated that the constraints on the export specifications 
were significant.  
Moreover, the Durbin-Watson statistics from the OLS regressions gave 
consistent indication of error auto-correlation for the level regressions for exports. 
However, we show below that this apparent rejection of the OLS specification is 
likely to be spurious and due to an unconstrained error-correction component: the 
real peso-dollar exchange rate is weakly exogenous in the export model VEC 
specifications and, therefore, should not be included in the cointegrating vector. 
When corrected for the weak exogeneity of the peso, the trace and max-eigenvalue 
statistics indicate cointegrating relations for all our VEC specifications (with one 
notable exception), allowing us to reject non-cointegration of the VEC, and allowing 
us to further discount the probability of spurious regression for the level regressions. 
Given the ambivalent causal relationships between the variables used in 
estimation, we thought it prudent to first identify contemporaneous relations with 
level OLS regressions. Lagged dependent and independent variables are present in 
the VEC model, and there the complex interrelations can be more carefully 
articulated. 
 
3.3  Dealing with the effects of NAFTA 
On the part of the United States, implementation of trade liberalization with Mexico 
during the period occurred in two significant steps in 1992 and 1994, as Figure 1 
indicates.  That figure presents the ratio of duty collections to the value of imports of 
manufactures, non-manufactures and passenger vehicles, respectively.  There is a 
steep drop in duty collections in 1992, followed by another drop in 1994, and then a 
gradual decline over the remainder of the period.  To underscore the preferential 
nature of these changes, we compare average duty collections on passenger vehicle 
imports from Mexico, Japan, and the rest of the world in Figure 2.  Duty rates on 
imports from Japan are largely unchanged, while those for the rest of the world 
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decline moderately and gradually over the period without any sharp reductions in 
1992 and 1994. 
A widely used approach to modeling the effect of NAFTA is by means of 
mean-shift dummies, which switch from zero to one in 1994, the year in which 
NAFTA went into effect.12  As noted and as the figures suggest, however, there were 
two episodes of tariff liberalization vis-à-vis Mexico during the period.  A simple 
1994 dummy risks misspecification, particularly in view of the possibility that it may 
pick up effects associated with the beginning of the peso crisis.13
In order to test for the effect of trade liberalization prior to the official start 
date of NAFTA, we use a dummy for 1992 as an alternative specification.  In order 
to further explore this issue, we use a two-stage dummy, which shifts to the value 
one in 1992 and takes on the value two beginning in 1994.  We also tested 
regressions with an interaction term between the mean-shift variable and U.S. GDP 
on the right-hand side, but that specification did not significantly improve the fit or 
explanatory power of the model with dummies alone. 
As an alternative to the dummy-variable approach, we employ the duty ratios 
of Figure 1 to construct a trade-liberalization variable defined as 1 plus the duty 
ratio.14  We expect imports in each of the three categories to increase as the ratio of 
duty collections relative to the value of imports in each category declines.  Hence, 
the coefficient is expected to be negative. 
 
3.4  U.S. imports from Mexico 
Table 2 presents regressions for U.S. imports from Mexico at the three levels of 
aggregation, with the four alternative specifications of trade liberalization during the 
period.  The regressions are significant, reflecting the very high degrees of 
correlation among the variables noted earlier.  Real U.S. GDP is significant in all 
regressions, with large coefficients across all levels of aggregation.   
The real exchange rate carries the largest coefficient and greatest t-value for 
non-manufactures, the most “traditional” of the three categories (See Table 1).  Its 
explanatory power is generally weaker as predicted for manufacturing imports and 
disappears altogether for imports of motor vehicles.15  The results confirm our 
prediction that the influence of exchange-rate changes is eroded by the rise of 
network trade. 
The effect of the NAFTA dummies varies across the import categories; it is 
significant for manufactures and motor vehicles, but insignificant for non-
manufacturing imports.  The latter result is consistent with the notion that the 
commodities contained in that category were least affected by NAFTA-based trade 
liberalization.16   The sign on the fourth NAFTA variable, namely, the ratio of duties 
collected on each of the three categories of imports relative to the value of those 
imports is negative, as predicted: a decline in the ratio is a sign of trade liberalization 
and should thus stimulate imports (Table 2d).   The coefficients are statistically 
significant in all three trade categories.17
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3.5 U.S. exports to Mexico 
U.S. exports are divided into manufactures, non-manufactures, and motor vehicle 
parts and components.  This is not the only way to break up total exports into groups 
reflecting different production arrangements, but data constraints typically come into 
play.  The main purpose here is to see whether the presence of network trade in the 
variable on the left-hand side affects the explanatory power of the widely-used 
export equation.  The right-hand-side variables include the real exchange rate, 
Mexican GDP, and a NAFTA dummy.  As noted above, manufacturing exports are 
the most “traditional” of the three export categories in that the share of goods 
destined for use by Mexicans is highest.  Hence, this category should display 
behavior that is most consistent with the standard trade model.  We expect the fit to 
be weaker for non-manufacturing exports, because the share of goods destined for 
use by Mexicans is smaller and the share of network trade is larger.18  Finally, we 
expect the fit of the standard model to be relatively poor in the regression for exports 
of motor vehicle parts. 
U.S. exports of goods destined for use by Mexicans should respond 
negatively to depreciation of the peso. For goods moving within production 
networks, on the other hand, the effect should be weaker. Hence, the exchange-rate 
coefficient may become insignificant for exports of non-manufactures and of motor 
vehicle parts.  Indeed, the sign of the coefficient may turn positive, if depreciation of 
the peso raises U.S. imports of motor vehicles, which in turn raises the demand for 
U.S.-made parts and components.  As discussed earlier, the power of Mexican GDP 
in explaining U.S. exports should fade as the importance of network trade rises. 
Table 3 reports results testing these hypotheses.  Our expectations with 
respect to the real exchange rate are largely confirmed.  The response of 
manufactures exports, the most traditional of the three categories, conforms more 
closely with the predictions of the standard model than non-manufactures and motor 
vehicle parts.  The latter, in particular, is closely tied to production sharing. 
Our expectations regarding the role of Mexican GDP remain largely 
unconfirmed by the results, at least as far as significance levels are concerned.  
While the magnitude of the coefficient is smaller for non-manufactures than for 
manufactures, the coefficient in the regression for motor vehicle parts is larger in 
panels 2a and 2b.  The results are more consistent with our expectations in panels 2c 
and 2d, in which U.S. GDP is added on the right-hand side.  There, Mexican GDP is 
insignificant for U.S. exports of non-manufactures and carries weaker significance 
(but a larger coefficient) for exports of motor vehicle parts.  U.S. GDP is significant 
in the regressions for all three categories.  The magnitude of the coefficient rises as 
we move from manufactures to non-manufactures, but the level of significance 
declines and is weakest for motor vehicle parts imports. 
As for the role of NAFTA, panel 2a reports results incorporating the 1994 
NAFTA dummy in the standard export equation.  As Figure 3 suggests, liberalization 
of trade in motor vehicle parts begins on the Mexican side in 1994.  U.S. exports rise 
with the inception of NAFTA.  We have no specific evidence of significant trade 
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liberalization in 1992, apart from the duty reductions reported on U.S. imports.19  
However, to allow for the possibility of spill-over effects resulting from the U.S. 
reductions, panel 2b employs the two-stage specification of NAFTA, the coefficient 
of which is significant in all three regressions.  The results are largely similar when 
U.S. GDP is added on the right-hand side of panels 2c and 2d. 
 
3.6 Vector error correction results 
As noted previously, VEC representations were also estimated for imports and for 
exports.20  The import results are based on the specification presented in Table 2d.  
The duties/imports variable is our preferred representation of NAFTA, not least 
because it provides a continuous series for identifying the error-correction 
component of the model.  There is, moreover, no empirical reason for preferring one 
of the other specifications (on a log likelihood basis).  The VEC coefficient estimates 
are robust to sample size, lag length of the error-correction components, as well as 
the presence or absence of a constant term in the error-correction component.21
In the import equations, the cointegrating vectors display significant 
coefficients and have signs that are consistent with the OLS representations.  The 
real peso is weakly exogenous to the system, and has very little significance, both 
contemporaneously and at various lags.  However, in the VEC for imports of non-
manufactures, the real peso is endogenous to the system, and so is included in the 
cointegrating equation.  The common trend term is significant throughout for U.S. 
GDP, but less so for non-manufactured imports and not at all for aggregate 
manufactured and passenger vehicle imports.  
The system of VEC equations generates impulse response functions.  There is 
a positive import response to U.S. GDP changes, and a negative response to import 
duties.  The size of both impulse responses increases as we proceed from 
manufactured imports to passenger vehicle imports, with the non-manufactured 
import response located somewhere in the middle.  Apart from the exchange-rate 
effect on non-manufactured imports, there is only a slight impulse response running 
to or from the other variables, consistent with the results of our basic OLS 
regressions. 
The export VEC specification is based on Table 3c22, which is consistent with 
the time-line of Mexican trade liberalization.  Here, both the real peso and U.S. GDP 
are weakly exogenous to the system and are thus relegated to the error-correction 
component of the specification. When OLS coefficients are used to calculate 
restricted versions of the VECs, the restrictions are non-binding, thus further 
mitigating our concerns about the adequacy of the OLS estimates. 
For manufactured and non-manufactured exports, the impulse responses and 
coefficients are consistent with the OLS regressions.  The significance of U.S. GDP 
in explaining U.S. exports to Mexico can now be seen in terms of its effect on the 
export error-correction response.  Manufactured exports are weakly influenced by 
U.S. GDP, but only Mexican GDP is significantly influenced by deviations from the 
cointegrating vector.  The reverse appears to be true for exports of non-
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manufactures, which are significantly positively influenced by Mexican GDP and 
trade liberalization, with U.S. GDP operating directly on non-manufactured exports 
and indirectly through its effect on Mexican GDP.  Mexican GDP is not significantly 
influenced by U.S. exports of non-manufactures. 
U.S. GDP was used in these VEC models in lieu of a direct measure of U.S. 
demand for commodities embodying exported components.  However, in the case of 
motor vehicle parts, we do have just such a measure in passenger vehicle imports.  
When included in the cointegrating equation, passenger vehicle imports are 
significantly cointegrated with motor vehicle parts exports, while Mexican GDP is 
not.  Table 10 presents the results, with Mexican GDP now relegated to a weakly 
exogenous influence on parts demand.  Interestingly, the unconstrained estimate 
presents a cointegrating regression coefficient on passenger vehicles of 0.93, 
indicating a long-run relationship in which all but 7 percent of parts exports are fully 
embodied in passenger vehicle imports.  The sign of the dummy term is now positive 
(though not significant), but that would appear to reflect the relatively greater 
significance of the NAFTA reforms to the importation of passenger vehicles, given 
the positive coefficient on error correction to that variable (and relatively 
insignificant response of parts exports to the same cointegrating relationship). 
The VEC model has been applied in a number of open-economy 
macroeconomic studies. The suitability of the approach for identifying relationships 
between variables that are not macroeconomic aggregates (or between aggregates 
and specific commodity flows) is still unclear. However, the import relationships 
estimated are consistent with our OLS results and reinforce the conclusions reached.  
The export results reveal a relatively more complicated relationship, but indicate the 
importance of U.S. income changes in the determination of Mexican production, 
affecting Mexican component imports from the U.S., and ultimately impacting 
Mexican GDP.  In the specific case of auto parts, Mexican GDP appears not to 
matter at all (or very little), with virtually all of the export demand being driven by 
the need for components for the production and importation of passenger vehicles for 
the U.S. market. 
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
The focus of this study has been to ascertain the extent to which the cross-border 
integration of production affects well-known relationships involving trade, the 
exchange rate, and key macroeconomic variables.  An argument is developed which 
suggests that the sensitivity of exports and imports to the real exchange rate should 
decline when cross-border fragmentation expands and when the share of trade 
associated with production networks rises. 
The evidence presented in this paper strongly supports that conjecture, 
showing that while the exchange-rate effect follows traditional lines for variables in 
which network trade is unimportant, the relationship fades as the share of network 
trade rises. 
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A country’s imports may become less sensitive to movements in domestic 
GDP and more responsive to foreign GDP as the share of trade related to cross-
border production sharing rises.  The evidence indicates that the explanatory power 
of Mexican GDP is weaker and that of U.S. GDP stronger in the regression on motor 
vehicle parts exports to Mexico than in the other export regressions.  From the VEC 
specification, we can identify the strong effect of U.S. GDP transmitted by U.S. 
imports of passenger vehicles. 
The official start of NAFTA in 1994 was preceded by U.S. trade 
liberalization vis-à-vis Mexico in 1992.   Regressions using dummies based on 1992 
provide superior performance to those based on 1994, and a two-step dummy 
outperforms both in our import equations.   In order to capture the continuity in trade 
liberalization over the length of the period, we construct a time series variable for the 
United States which relates duty collections to the flow of imports.  The variable is 
significant and has the correct sign, suggesting an important evolving role for trade 
liberalization in the region.  The export regressions confirm the role of NAFTA in 
U.S.-Mexico trade. 
  
Table 1. U.S. Trade with Mexico 
 Most Traditional Semi-traditional Least Traditional 
Exports Manufactures Non-manufactures Motor Vehicle Parts 
Imports Non-manufactures Manufactures Passenger Vehicles 
 
Note: Traditional in this context refers to traded goods intended for final 
consumption or use by the importing country and not containing value-added of the 
importing country (parts and components). Least Traditional refers to traded goods 
with a high proportion of commodities used in production sharing networks, in this 
instance intended for final consumption in the United States. 
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    Figure 1. Average U.S. ad valorem Duties on Mexican Merchandise Imports 
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    Figure 2. Average Ad Valorem US Duties on PV Imports 
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 Figure 3. Average Mexican Ad Valorem Tariff on Imports of U.S. MV Parts 
(selected)  
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      Figure 4. U.S.-Mexico Manufactures Trade 
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        Figure 5. U.S.-Mexico Non-Manufactures Trade 
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Source: USITC Trade Data. 
 
    Figure 6. U.S.-Mexico Passenger Vehicle Trade 
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Table 2. Imports 
 
(a) Manufactures 
Non-
Manu-
factures 
PV   (b) Manufactures 
Non-
Manu-
factures 
PV 
C 4.98*** (5.74) 
10.08*** 
(8.02) 
0.07 
(0.02)  C 
2.25*** 
(4.92) 
9.27*** 
(12.27) 
-4.48** 
(-2.19) 
GDPU
S
3.92*** 
(23.07) 
2.13*** 
(8.52) 
4.49*** 
(6.48)  
GDPU
S
4.39*** 
(48.56) 
2.32*** 
(15.53) 
5.27*** 
(13.06) 
Peso/$
Real
-0.01 
(-0.12) 
0.54*** 
(4.00) 
-0.8 
(-0.21)  
Peso/
$Real
0.33*** 
(4.76) 
0.64*** 
(5.54) 
0.5 
(1.6) 
D94
0.23*** 
(5.7) 
0.07 
(1.21) 
0.38** 
(2.34)  D92
0.19*** 
(7.28) 
0.04 
(0.93) 
0.33*** 
(2.78) 
         
R2 0.99 0.89 0.88  R2 0.99 0.89 0.88 
Adj. 
R2 0.99 0.88 0.87  
Adj. 
R2 0.99 0.88 0.88 
LL 72.72 50.95 -6.1  LL 78.8 50.64 -5.02 
D-W 0.81 1.84 0.78  D-W 1.16 1.86 0.78 
E-G -3.00 -4.7 -4.02  E-G -4.07 -4.69 -4.09 
         
(c) Manufactures 
Non-
Manu-
factures 
PV  (d) Manufactures 
Non-
Manu-
factures 
PV  
C 4.32*** (7.69) 
9.85*** 
(9.79) 
-0.97 
(-0.36)  C 
7.15*** 
(8.67) 
11.99*** 
(7.99) 
1.51 
(0.41) 
GDPU
S
3.99*** 
(35.33) 
2.2*** 
(10.9) 
4.61*** 
(8.47)  
GDPU
S
3.49*** 
(21.57) 
1.81*** 
(6.33) 
4.23*** 
(6.00) 
Peso/$
Real
0.15** 
(2.25) 
0.59*** 
(5.11) 
0.18 
(0.59)  
Peso/
$Real
0.08 
(1.15) 
0.51*** 
(4.15) 
0.04 
(0.11) 
D92/94
0.13*** 
(8.51) 
0.03 
(1.2) 
0.23*** 
(3.00)  ii Mτ+1
-11.57*** 
(-8.67) 
-11.87** 
(-2.25) 
-
21.05*** 
(-2.69) 
R2 0.99 0.89 0.89  R2 0.99 0.89 0.88 
Adj. 
R2 0.99 0.88 0.89  
Adj. 
R2 0.99 0.89 0.88 
LL 83.55 50.94 -4.44  LL 84.16 52.77 -5.25 
D-W 1.22 1.86 0.81  D-W 1.1 1.98 0.77 
E-G -4.21 -4.7 -4.16  E-G -4.35 -5.02 -4.21 
 
Number of Observations: 56 (t-stats in parentheses) 
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Table 3. Exports 
 
(a) Manu-factures 
Non-
Manu-
factures 
MV Parts  (b) Manu-factures 
Non-
Manu-
factures 
MV 
Parts 
C 12.59*** (11.13) 
14.25*** 
(7.38) 
4.87** 
(2.09)  C 
11.69*** 
(12.04) 
12.94*** 
(7.88) 
7.7*** 
(3.48) 
GDPMx
2.38*** 
(11.5) 
1.28*** 
(3.61) 
3.41*** 
(7.9)  GDPMx
2.52*** 
(13.98) 
1.5*** 
(4.83) 
2.87*** 
(6.98) 
Peso/$Real
-0.37** 
(-2.38) 
0.14 
(0.58) 
0.5 
(1.15)  Peso/$Real
-0.17 
(-1.28) 
0.32 
(1.6) 
-0.22 
(-0.66) 
D94
0.24*** 
(5.65) 
0.19** 
(2.46) 
0.38*** 
(3.72)  D92/94
0.13*** 
(5.92) 
0.09** 
(2.16) 
0.3*** 
(5.39) 
R2 0.97 0.73 0.89  R2 0.97 0.72 0.91 
Adj. R2 0.96 0.71 0.88  Adj. R2 0.97 0.71 0.9 
LL 61.95 30.36 8.34  LL 62.99 29.69 14.14 
D-W 1.27 1.34 0.95  D-W 1.42 1.37 0.92 
E-G -2.55 -4.41 -2.76  E-G -2.89 -4.34 -3.19 
         
(c) Manu-factures 
Non-
Manu-
factures 
MV Parts  (d) Manu-factures 
Non-
Manu-
factures 
MV 
Parts 
C 11.46*** (10.64) 
13.12*** 
(7.00) 
-1.5 
(-0.54)  C 
11.31*** 
(13.74) 
12.78*** 
(8.36) 
3.83 
(1.66) 
GDPMx
1.5*** 
(4.75) 
-0.04 
(-0.07) 
1.41** 
(2.01)  GDPMx
1.36*** 
(4.7) 
-0.07 
(-0.13) 
1.22* 
(2.00) 
GDPUS
1.14*** 
(3.48) 
1.63*** 
(2.67) 
3.26*** 
(3.47)  GDPUS
1.29*** 
(4.69) 
1.71*** 
(3.00) 
2.42*** 
(3.39) 
Peso/$Real
-0.4*** 
(-2.86) 
0.04 
(0.16) 
0.56* 
(1.55)  Peso/$Real
-0.32** 
(-2.76) 
0.1 
(0.47) 
0.08 
(0.26) 
D94
0.16*** 
(3.7) 
0.09 
(1.13) 
0.07 
(0.58)  D92/94
0.1*** 
(5.17) 
0.05 
(1.29) 
0.2*** 
(3.41) 
R2 0.97 0.76 0.91  R2 0.98 0.76 0.92 
Adj. R2 0.97 0.74 0.9  Adj. R2 0.98 0.74 0.92 
LL 67.92 34.04 14.27  LL 73.04 34.24 19.84 
D-W 0.67 1.41 0.67  D-W 0.68 1.41 0.73 
E-G -1.92 -5.57 -2.43  E-G -2.19 -5.59 -2.91 
 
Number of Observations: 56 (t-stats in parentheses) 
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-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of Manufactures Imports to U.S. GDP
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of Manufactures Imports to Man. Duties
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
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Response of U.S. GDP to Manufactures Imports
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
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Response of U.S. GDP to Man. Duties
-.08
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.04
.08
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Response of Man. Duties to Manufactures Imports
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of Man. Duties to U.S. GDP
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations
)81.6(                )02.14(                                          
)M1(97.12GDP23.306.8Imports esManufactur 4. Table iiUS
−
τ+⋅+⋅−−
 
 
Error Correction: Δ(Manuf. 
Imports) 
Δ(GDPUS) Δ ( ii Mτ+1 ) 
Cointegrating Eq(-1) -0.36** 
(-2.3) 
0.02 
(1.28) 
-0.02*** 
(-3.16) 
Δ(Manuf. Imports(-1)) 0.03 
(0.18) 
-0.01 
(-0.52) 
0.003 
(0.62) 
Δ(GDPUS(-1)) 2.13 
(1.6) 
0.35** 
(2.41) 
-0.05 
(-1.21) 
Δ[( ii Mτ+1 ) (-1)] 3.97 
(1.03) 
-0.11 
(-0.27) 
0.28** 
(2.36) 
Δ( PesoReal) 0.04 
(0.74) 
-0.002 
(0.23) 
-0.01* 
(-1.84) 
Linear Data Trend -0.04 
(-0.53) 
0.005*** 
(3.7) 
-0.0003 
(-0.73) 
R2 0.17 0.13 0.28 
Adj. R2 0.08 0.04 0.2 
Trace Statistic 36.5*** 
Max-Eigenvalue Statistic 21.43** 
Log Likelihood 569.33 
Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted) 564.37 
Number of Observations: 54 
(t-stats in parentheses)  
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)99.3(                  )51.3(              )04.4(                                                      
)M1(37.23Peso43.0GDP25.185.14Imports esManufactur-Non 5. Table iialReUS
−−
τ+⋅+⋅−⋅−−
 
 
Error Correction: Δ( N-M 
Imports) 
Δ(GDPUS) Δ( PesoReal) Δ( ii Mτ+1 ) 
Cointegrating Eq(-1) -0.8*** 
(-3.93) 
0.02* 
(1.69) 
-0.12 
(-0.93) 
-0.01 
(-1.52) 
Δ(N-M Imports(-1)) -0.1 
(-0.7) 
-0.01* 
(-1.83) 
0.13 
(1.38) 
0.003 
(0.93) 
Δ(GDPUS(-1)) -3.28 
(1.25) 
0.31** 
(2.35) 
1.8 
(1.1) 
-0.003 
(-0.05) 
Δ( PesoReal(-1)) -0.21 
(-0.91) 
-0.01 
(-0.48) 
-0.19 
(-1.3) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
Δ[( ii Mτ+1 ) (-1)] 3.82 
(0.54) 
-0.57 
(-1.6) 
-4.67 
(-1.06) 
0.07 
(0.45) 
Linear Data Trend 0.04* 
(1.74) 
0.005*** 
(4.06) 
-0.02 
(-1.6) 
-0.0003 
(-0.59) 
R2 0.46 0.21 0.12 0.05 
Adj. R2 0.4 0.12 0.03 -0.04 
Trace Statistic 49.23** 
Max-Eigenvalue Statistic 28.41** 
Log Likelihood 595.76 
Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted) 583.04 
Number of Observations: 54 
(t-stats in parentheses)  
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of N-M Imports to U.S. GDP
-.08
.08
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.04
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.08
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Response of N-M Imports to N-M Duties
-.08
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-.08
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.00
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.08
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Response of Peso/$ to U.S. GDP
-.08
Response of Peso/$ to N-M Duties
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations
.08
-.04
.00
.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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-.08
-.04
.00
)15.4(                  )2.3(                         
)M1(93.45GDP2.8616.8ImportsPV  6. Table iiUS
−
τ+⋅+⋅−−
 
.04
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PV Imports to U.S. GDP
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PV Imports to PV Duties
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of U.S. GDP to PV Imports
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of U.S. GDP to PV Duties
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PV Duties to PV Imports
-.08
Response of PV Duties to U.S. GDP
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations
 
 Error Correction: Δ(PV Imports) Δ(GDPUS) Δ ( ii Mτ+1 ) 
Cointegrating Eq(-1) -0.43*** 
(-3.81) 
-0.002 
(-0.86) 
-0.003*** 
(-2.94) 
Δ(PV Imports(-1)) 0.27* 
(1.88) 
-0.004 
(-1.13) 
0.001 
(0.68) 
Δ(GDPUS(-1)) -5.3 
(-0.96) 
0.29** 
(2.03) 
-0.13*** 
(-2.75) 
Δ[( ii Mτ+1 ) (-1)] 9.42 (0.62) -0.36 (-0.92) 0.13 (0.96) 
Δ( PesoReal) -0.41 
(-0.92) 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
-0.001 
(-0.2) 
Linear Data Trend 0.06 
(1.29) 
0.005*** 
(3.97) 
0.0004 
(1.15) 
R2 0.24 0.2 0.22 
Adj. R2 0.16 0.12 0.13 
Trace Statistic 30.7** 
Max-Eigenvalue Statistic 21.9** 
Log Likelihood 489.46 
Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted) 479.92 
Number of Observations: 54 
(t-stats in parentheses)  .08
-.04
.00
.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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)88.4(            )75.19(                                                 
D11.0GDP2.973.9Exports esManufactur 7. Table 94/92Mx
−−
⋅−⋅−−
 
 
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of Manufactures Exports to Mexican GDP
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of Manufactures Exports to D92/94
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of Mexican GDP to Manufactures Exports
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of Mexican GDP to D92/94
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations
 
 
Error 
Correction: 
Δ(Manuf. 
Exports) 
Δ(GDPMx) 
Cointegrating 
Eq(-1) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.29*** 
(4.31) 
Δ(Manuf. 
Exports(-1)) 
0.27 
(1.39) 
-0.01 
(-0.12) 
Δ(GDPMx(-1)) -0.74** 
(-2.51) 
-0.5*** 
(-3.58) 
Δ(GDPUS) 3.41** 
(2.44) 
0.95 
(1.44) 
Δ(PesoReal) -0.32*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.04 
(0.83) 
Linear Data 
Trend 
-0.002 
(-0.2) 
0.005 
(0.8) 
R2 0.42 0.75 
Adj. R2 0.34 0.71 
28.92Trace * 
Max-Eigen Statistic 21.7** 
Log Likelihood 232.00 
Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted) 224.68 
Number of Observations: 54 
(t-stats in parentheses)  
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)54.1(               )6.4(                                                              
D07.0GDP36.12.14Exports esManufactur-Non 8. Table 94/92Mx
−−
⋅−⋅−−
 
-.04
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.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
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Response of N-M Exports to Mexican GDP
-.04
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.00
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.04
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Response of N-M Exports to D92/94
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
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Response of Mexican GDP to N-M Exports
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of Mexican GDP to D92/94
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations Error 
Correction: 
Δ(N-M Exports) Δ(GDPMx) 
Cointegrating 
Eq(-1) 
-0.68*** 
(-3.85) 
0.03 
(0.82) 
Δ(N-M 
Exports(-1)) 
0.11 
(0.55) 
-0.002 
(-0.06) 
Δ(GDPMx(-1)) 0.08 
 
(0.19) 
-0.72*** 
(-7.26) 
Δ(GDPUS) 4.62 
(1.27) 
1.63* 
(1.99) 
Δ(PesoReal) -0.27 
(-0.89) 
0.04 
(0.59) 
Linear Data 
Trend 
-0.02 
(-0.56) 
0.002 
(0.25) 
R2 0.31 0.59 
Adj. R2 0.22 0.54 
Trace 31.95** 
Max-Eigen Statistic 23.44** 
Log Likelihood 175.02 
Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted) 168.09 
Number of Observations: 54 
(t-stats in parentheses)  
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)66.4(              )52.4(                                             
D45.0GDP2.7464.7Exports PartsMV  9. Table 94/92Mx
−−
⋅−⋅−−
 
 
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
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Response of MV Parts Exports to Mexican GDP
-.04
-.03
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.00
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-.04
-.03
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Response of Mexican GDP to MV Parts Exports
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of Mexican GDP to D92/94
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations 
 
Error 
Correction: 
Δ(MV Parts Exports) Δ(GDPMx) 
Cointegrating 
Eq(-1) 
-0.003 
(-0.03) 
0.08*** 
(3.19) 
Δ(MV Parts 
Exports(-1)) 
-0.27* 
(-1.75) 
-0.08** 
(-2.41) 
Δ(GDPMx(-1)) -0.4 
(-0.96) 
-0.62*** 
(-6.79) 
Δ(GDPUS) 0.86 
(0.26) 
1.74** 
(2.39) 
Δ(PesoReal) 0.48 
(1.61) 
0.11 
(1.66) 
Linear Data 
Trend 
0.04 
(1.32) 
0.04 
(1.32) 
R2 0.17 0.67 
Adj. R2 0.07 0.63 
Trace 19.19 
Max-Eigen Statistic 14.34 
Log Likelihood 172.6 
Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted) 171.78 
Number of Observations: 54 
(t-stats in parentheses)  
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)42.1(                        )28.8(                                            
D15.0ImportsPV .9301.0Exports PartsMV  10. Table 94/92
−
⋅+⋅−+
 
 
 
Error 
Correction: 
Δ(MV Parts 
Exports) 
Δ(PV Imports) 
Cointegrating 
Eq(-1) 
-0.06 
(-0.73) 
0.46*** 
(3.35) 
Δ(MV Parts 
Exports(-1)) 
-0.15 
(-0.94) 
-0.04 
(-0.15) 
Δ(PV 
Imports(-1)) 
-0.13 
(-1.37) 
0.3** 
(1.95) 
Δ(GDPMx) 0.49 
(1.23) 
1.26** 
(1.99) 
Δ(PesoReal) 0.57** 
(2.05) 
-0.23 
(-0.52) 
R2 0.22 0.27 
Adj. R2 0.12 0.18 
27.15Trace * 
Max-Eigen Statistic 20.41* 
Log Likelihood 77.6 
Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted) 65.41 
Number of Observations: 54 
(t-stats in parentheses)  
VOL.
34                            THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ASYMMETRIES                  JUNE 2007 
Appendix  
Table A.1. Unit Root Tests 
Augmented Dickey-
Fuller 
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests 
Level 1st 
Difference 
Level 1st 
Difference 
intercept 0.75 -5.09*** 0.42 -5.13*** GDPUS
(1995 = 100) Intercept+trend -2.03 -5.09*** -2.17 -5.15*** 
intercept -0.74 -3.33** -1.2 -22.55*** GDPMX
(1995 = 100) Intercept+trend -3.0 -3.29* -
5.76*** 
-22.26*** 
intercept -1.28 -7.4*** -1.28 -7.4*** Manufactured 
Exports Intercept+trend -1.88 -7.43*** -1.94 -7.43*** 
intercept -1.6 -2.24 -1.31 -7.86*** Manufactured 
Imports Intercept+trend -0.52 -2.5 -1.56 -7.81*** 
intercept -1.81 -5.69*** -1.65 -15.67*** Non-
Manufactured 
Exports 
Intercept+trend -5.16*** -5.63*** -
4.87*** 
-16.62*** 
intercept -1.2 -12.53*** -1.4 -14.52*** Non-
Manufactured 
Imports (SA) 
Intercept+trend -2.71 -12.41*** -
4.62*** 
-14.32*** 
intercept -1.49 -9.51*** -1.6 -9.51*** MV Parts 
Exports Intercept+trend -2.47 -9.61*** -2.32 -9.68*** 
intercept -1.6 -7.01*** -1.52 -9.91*** PV Imports 
Intercept+trend -3.56** -6.95*** -2.91 -9.98*** 
intercept -1.76 -6.05*** -1.84 -7.88*** Real Peso/$ 
Intercept+trend -1.99 -5.99*** -2.18 -7.8*** 
 
All variables in log terms.  All trade figures deflated with U.S. WPI. 
Sample: 1989:Q1 – 2002:Q4 
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Table A.2. Correlation Matrices 
 
 GDPUS GDPMX PesoReal Man 
Ex 
NoMan 
Ex 
MVP 
Ex 
Trend 
GDPUS 1       
GDPMX 0.95 1      
PesoReal -0.48 -0.63 1     
Man Ex 0.97 0.97 -0.58 1    
NoMan 
Ex 
0.87 0.81 -0.36 0.85 1   
MVP Ex 0.94 0.92 -0.47 0.97 0.82 1  
Trend 0.99 0.95 -0.51 0.97 0.85 0.96 1 
 
 GDPUS GDPMX PesoReal Man 
Im 
NoMan 
Im 
PV Im Trend 
GDPUS 1       
GDPMX 0.95 1      
PesoReal -0.48 -0.63 1     
Man Im 0.99 0.94 -0.43 1    
NoMan 
Im 
0.92 0.89 -0.37 0.89 1   
PV Im 0.93 0.9 -0.4 0.96 0.84 1  
Trend 0.99 0.95 -0.51 0.99 0.9 0.95 1 
 
 Man Ex Man 
Im 
NoMan 
Ex 
NoMan Im PV Im MVP Ex 
Man Ex 1      
Man Im 0.97 1     
NoMan 
Ex 
0.85 0.86 1    
NoMan 
Im 
0.83 0.91 0.79 1   
PV Im 0.93 0.96 0.8 0.84 1  
MVP Ex 0.97 0.96 0.82 0.84 0.95 1 
 
Period: 1989:Q1 – 2002:Q4 
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1  Sven W. Arndt is a Professor at the Department of Economics at Claremont 
McKenna College and Director of the Lowe Institute of Political Economy. Alex 
Huemer is a Research Fellow at the Lowe Institute of Political Economy at 
Claremont McKenna College. Corresponding Author: Sven W. Arndt, Lowe Institute 
of Political Economy, Claremont McKenna College, 850 Columbia Avenue, 
Claremont, CA 91711-6420. Telephone: (909) 621-8012, Fax: (909) 607-8008, E-
mail: lowe@claremontmckenna.edu. Earlier versions of these results were reported 
at workshops and conferences in Claremont, Beijing, Cambridge, U.K. and Tokyo. 
Helpful comments from conference participants are gratefully acknowledged. 
Thanks to Alan Winters for especially valuable comments and suggestions. 
2  For detailed discussions, see Arndt (1997, 1998), Deardorff (2001), and Jones 
and Kierzkowski (2001).  See also Feenstra (1998). 
3 Where multinational companies are involved, transfer-pricing policies may result in 
cost allocations that may differ from arms-length operations.  We ignore the problem 
in what follows. 
4  For a related study, see Landon and Smith (2007).  These features have 
potentially important implications for the choice of the exchange-rate regime.  The 
declining sensitivity of the trade balance to the exchange rate can be used as an 
argument to support floating exchange rates, because it reduces the effect of 
exchange-rate volatility on the volume of trade. It may, however, also be used 
against floating rates, because it reduces the importance of the exchange rate as 
buffer. 
5  The trade data are taken from the International Financial Statistics of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and publications of the U.S. Census Bureau, 
while import-duty information comes from the U.S. International Trade Commission 
(USITC).  The latter two series are available in sufficient detail only after 1989 and 
undergo considerable redefinition in the Harmonized System classification after 
2002. 
6  Manufactures and non-manufactures are identified by their SIC/NAICS 
classifications.  Non-manufactured imports from Mexico are net of oil and gas 
(which are subject to dollar pricing in the world petroleum market), and are 
seasonally adjusted with the Tramo/Seats methodology (to correct for seasonality in 
agriculture).  Inclusion of petroleum (the largest U.S. non-manufactured import from 
Mexico) generates some non-manufactured import regression results that are similar 
to those for production-sharing trade, but for very different reasons.  The dollar value 
of petroleum imports remains unaffected by real peso changes, since Mexican 
petroleum is priced in dollars. 
7  Wholesale prices are used because measures of bilateral import and export 
prices were not available for Mexico. 
8  See Engle and Granger (1991), pp. 81-111. 
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9  While the Durbin-Watson statistics are likely to indicate serial correlation in 
view of the relatively small size of our sample, the super-consistency properties of 
the OLS estimators assure rapid convergence as the sample size increases.  When 
AR(1) terms are included in the regressions, the Durbin-Watsons and Q-statistics 
typically move into the desired range. 
10  See Engle and Granger (1991), pp. 65-80, and Granger (1969). 
11  The constraints are applied to the cointegrating vector coefficients. The method 
of Johansen and Juselius (1990) was adopted in estimating the VEC representation.  
Following Johansen (1992), a variant of the method of Pantula (1989) was used to 
identify the model rank of cointegration (consistently one) and to assess the role of 
the constant and trend terms in the cointegrating and error-correction components of 
the model. 
12  Market anticipations of a policy shift may make the official start date an 
improper indicator of the impact of that policy. 
13  It might be argued that NAFTA generated both a mean shift and a trend shift.  
We experimented with various specifications, including separate trend variables and 
interactions between the mean shift variable and U.S. GDP, interpreting the latter as 
the dominant trend variable.  The results were uniformly inferior to those reported 
here.  As noted earlier, the main variables in these bilateral trade relations are highly 
correlated and exhibit strong common trends.  The fact that they are identified as of 
common order of integration and of being cointegrated argues against the need for an 
additional independent trend in the dependent variable.  A theoretical motivation for 
inclusion of a trend found in the literature is based on the assumption of declining 
transport costs and/or border effects.  In our specification, however, some of those 
effects are already controlled for in the duty rate variable and others in the trade 
liberalization dummies. 
14  The measure is constructed for U.S. imports only, because comparable data were 
not available for Mexico. 
15  There is the possibility of strong J-curve effects arising from the large real peso 
depreciation of 1994. However, the data are quarterly, which allows sufficient time 
to overcome most short-term demand inelasticities. Further, as figures 4-5 show, the 
balance-of-payments movements after the peso crisis do not suggest a J-curve effect; 
and Figure 6 shows that the subsequent slight decrease in passenger vehicle imports 
was consistent with a decline in import quantities, not a valuation effect arising from 
the depreciation. 
16  Recall that the two-step representation of NAFTA switches to the value one in 
1992 and to the value two in 1994. 
17  We might be concerned about erroneously attributing to NAFTA effects 
stemming from the peso crisis of 1994, especially in the NAFTA measure used in 
Table 2d.  The depreciation of the peso reduces the dollar value of U.S. imports and 
thus the dollar value of duty collections, especially when duties are of the ad valorem 
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type.  However, examination of average U.S. dollar prices for passenger vehicle 
imports from Mexico indicates no significant deviation from trend over the period 
1989-2002, thus limiting the likely significance of such concerns. 
18  The top six SIC/NAICS non-manufactured goods exported to Mexico by the 
United States over the period were various feed grains and cotton. While end-use of 
these commodities cannot be clearly identified, they comprise categories of 
commodities used in other types of production (baked goods, livestock, leather goods 
and apparel, etc.) likely to be exported back to the United States in some quantity. 
19  It is apparent, in the context of production sharing, that U.S. exports to Mexico 
will be affected by trade liberalization in two ways.  First, liberalization on Mexico’s 
part will encourage imports.  Second, U.S. liberalization will encourage imports from 
Mexico and imports incorporating U.S.-made components will raise the demand for 
U.S. exports.     
20  Import results are reported in Tables 4 through 6; export results in Tables 7 
through 10. 
21  Note that all the import and export categories have only one significant 
cointegrating vector. 
22  Separate estimates were made using the 1994 dummy, with little or no change in 
the overall result, and no qualitative change in the conclusions drawn from the use of 
the two-step dummy variables.  Following Johansen (1995), the dummies were 
centered to prevent bias to the intercept variables. 
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